The anti-money laundering (AML) process has failed both in identifying suspicious cases in 
The Know Your Customer (KYC) policy, defined by the Basel Committee 1 in [4] , is like a best 48 practices guide in the sense that it details the procedures to be followed to prevent fraud. Based on The generic process of fraud prevention is based on regulations and recommendations issued by 55 control offices and uses parameters that set limits for quantities and values involved in transactions.
56
The analysis of the transactions is carried out in a short period of time and the majority is carried out 57 by a human analyst.
58
Some authors classify money laundering as a predicate crime, i.e., a crime that always occurs due 59 to some other underlying crime that would illicitly provide its author proceeds that later he, or others,
60
will intend to camouflage [5] . However, it is possible to analyse the money laundering crime as an The BCBS -Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, linked to the BIS -Bank for International Settlements, was established in 1974 to enhance financial stability by improving the quality of banking supervision worldwide, and to serve as a forum for regular cooperation between its member countries on banking supervisory matters to strengthen regulation, supervision and best practices in the financial market. parameters by production rules, based on these profiles and the norms and existing recommendations; 71 and 3) the use of intelligence at some points of the process. This way, the quality level in the capture of 72 suspicious operations and, especially, of decision making by the specialist, is clearly improved.
73
Creating a new instance of the generic flow proposed in Figure 2 for the ML crime, it is possible 
Related Work

77
The adaptability of the "modus operandi" of fraudsters and the lack of systematized information to a data set to find a more adequate set of clusters. Kingdon [9] proposed that an artificial intelligence 86 approach should model individual clients and look for unusual rather than suspicious behaviour. There 87 are also statistical approaches, like the ones described in Liu and Zhang [10] and Tang and Yin [11] .
88
In , the authors present a case study corresponding to the application of 
119
Tests carried out showed that the client type attribute was not enough to offer a good 120 characterization of the groups formed in this unsupervised data base. Thus, to better characterize the 121 clients, the database was divided: one with individual clients and another with corporate type clients.
122
The procedure described below was performed independently for each database. 
128
With the purpose of establishing transactional behaviour profiles, in a certain period, we created 129 a set of attributes, which aggregate quantities and segment characteristics for each actor of the process.
130
The period measured is directly related to the nature of the business involved, presenting the maximum 131 possible duration, for example quarterly, semi-annual, annual, etc.
132
One year of transactions was used to generate the client transactional behaviour profile, that is, RelevantTransactions-RT ← TTB analysis
Step 1 4:
ClientPro f iles-CP ← RT attribute selection / generation
Step 2
5:
Numbero f Clusters-k ← Number of CP Attributes -1
Step 3 6:
Seto f Clusters-Cl ← Classification algorithm (algc (CP, k)) 8:
VectorError2-E2 (k) ← Calculates Classification Error (algr2 (Cl)) 10:
end while
12:
Indexo f MinorError-idx ← Finds Minor (E1, E2)
Step 4 13:
returns FC, R1, R2
Step 5 17: end procedure
Cautious Approach to Risk
148
The analysis of the generated clusters, for the two customer segments, allowed the identification Table 1 .
152
With this classification, it is possible to define a better strategy, offering differentiated treatment to 153 the groups of clients, according to their level of risk. Despite the excellent level of accuracy obtained in 154 the evaluation of the generated rules, around 99% for both customer segments, an error of one percent 155 represents more than 26 thousand transactions and cannot be ignored.
156
The confusion matrix generated by the rules algorithms has identified the rules that, because they 157 are applicable to two or more groups of clients, represent the one percent error mentioned. That is, 158 rules classify customers as belonging to more than one profile. Probably there is a configuration of the 159 parameters of the algorithms used that allows to minimize this error, however, the number of rules 160 increases significantly, making the cost / benefit little attractive. The decision was to reclassify the 161 profiles that do not represent risk or have low risk (profiles one, two and three), as shown in Table 1 .
162
Thus, the transaction that belongs to one of these three groups will be reclassified, only for analysis 163 process, if there is a rule that satisfies the condition. Thus, the problem was corrected conservatively 164 using the same amount of rules.
165
For example, in the database used for data mining, 33 rules classify customers as individual client 166 belonging to risk profiles two and three, corresponding to 1.85% of the total. However, these rules also 167 classify 0.06% of customers originally belonging to the standard profile. The reclassification consists 168 of, during the process of searching for a suspicious transaction, consider these standard clients as 169 belonging to the risk groups, without modifying the original classification.
170
The classification of profiles also allows the creation of specific rules, whether based on current 171 regulations or inspired by transactional behaviour. As already mentioned, this work used one year of 172 information to generate the profiles, obtaining monthly totals and allowing to select maximum values 
AML Multi-Agent System
177
The goal of this system is to support the AML process in a financial institution and the global 178 system architecture is presented in Figure 4 .
179
The system will keep up a profile for each customer, based on the transaction history, which will The profiles to be analysed complete the set of information that will be manipulated by the system 195 in the process of capture and analysis of suspicious transactions, the main focus of this work.
196
To achieve the proposed objectives, it is necessary to define a set of entities capable of making 197 decisions, using existing knowledge and learning from the decisions taken by the human analysts.
198
These entities need to have action autonomy and be able to communicate with one another. is generic and can be used in a range of agent programming platforms.
213
Considering characteristics such as: quantity and relevance of available historical data that will be 214 used for decision making; the aforementioned need, during the process, for review and expansion of 215 the knowledge acquired; the possibility of developing new sub-objectives/objectives; we understand 216 that Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) is the appropriate model to adopt. Moreover,Prometheus is strongly 217 targeted to BDI. Figure 5 shows the main system elements that make up the adopted BDI model and 218 how they link to our problem. 
257
The decision making of this agent uses the defined decision matrix and what was learnt from the 258 history of decisions about complex cases.
259
The internal knowledge of the system is formed by the profiles base, the norms and 260 recommendations base, the control rules base and the decision matrix. For each one of these knowledge 261 bases there is an agent responsible for its evolution. shows, briefly, an example of the interaction process between agents.
296
Interaction amongst other agents (DMH, MER, NDU, CRDU, CPDU) has the role to trigger in 297 each of these agents the goal to perform the task under its responsibility. In other words, all agents 298 have their own specific expertise, and they have independent and not conflicting goals. On the other 299 hand, there is plenty of cooperation for the achievement of a common goal. JaCaMo is based on three independent platforms: a) Jason for programming the agents level, 
Results
316
The real data used in this work refer to two years, with 30.5 million and 35.2 million relevant 317 transactions, respectively. The client transactional behavioural profiles were generated from the data 318 of the first year, the reference base. The search for suspicious transactions was executed over six 319 months of relevant transactions in the second year, resulting in 17.1 million transactions. Over these 320 transactions, 3.2 million transactional client behavioural profiles were generated for those months.
321
The systems in use in most banking institutions are strongly based on client information bank 322 register, that's why they can identify as suspicious the incompatibility between the sum of transaction 323 values and the customer income or billing information. The system proposed in this article does not 324 use the same client information bank register and therefore will not signal such situations as suspicious.
325
This system is based on the client's transactional behaviour and should be adopted as a complementary 326 tool. The initial strategy used to select suspect profiles for verification by human analysts and examples 327 of reports issued by system was shown in [31].
328
The characteristics described above justify why the result obtained by the system here presented 329 did not identify the same suspects identified by systems actually running. However, it is important to 330 highlight that this system has signalled cases that were confirmed by human analysts and that were 331 not identified in the past by the systems in execution.
332
The process of searching for suspicious transactions, implemented to date, can be divided into the first month evaluated, 418 profiles were reclassified, leaving the "standard profile" to "medium"
338
and "high risk" profiles, only in that analysis. Table 2 shows a summary of the results obtained, where 339 profiles are indicated as suspicious in the six months analysed. Figure 8 shows some examples of the 340 rules used in the process. cases were confirmed as suspects, six of which will required more in-depth investigations by bank 351 branch involved, and six were clearly identified as suspects; c) all cases classified by the system as 352 being "high risk" had not been previously reported; d) of the six fully confirmed suspects 4 had never 353 been previously reported.
354
Considering the purpose of the system to assist the AML analyst and its learning ability, it is 355 possible to observe that the analysis phase need refinement, considering the 26 cases indicated as 356 suspicious but not confirmed, even though these were not considered false positive. specialists.
361
With our work we explored new approaches to combat both fraud and money laundering, and
362
have described a multiagent system that is successful in this task, using specialization and cooperation 363 between intelligent agents, in order to optimize and improve the quality of the process of signalling 364 suspicious profiles in the anti-money laundering process.
groups and to create the client transactional behaviour profiles. These profiles were used as a marker 367 for future behaviour.
368
The results obtained show the feasibility of systematic use and establish a new front to combat 369 this crime. The quality of the results has been attested by the verification realized by the anti-money 370 laundering analyst in the signalled suspicious transactions, in which it is worth highlighting that all 371 cases classified by the system as being "high risk" suspects had not been previously reported; of the 6 fully 372 confirmed suspects 4 had never been previously reported by any other system running.
373
As next future step we will review and improve the analysis phase, considering the 26 cases 374 indicated as suspicious but not confirmed, even though these were not considered false positive. The 375 strategy will be to complete the learning based on the decisions of the AML analyst, thus allowing 376 better signalling.
